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Can Local Governments Provide
Protection to Vulnerable Communities in
California, a State Which has Legalized
Predatory Payday Lending and
Failed to Pass Reform?
KRISTA R. GRANEN*
He was impressed. He was impressed that, first off, that
payday lenders charged more than twice what a loan shark
would charge. Of course, they don't break knee caps if you
don't pay them back. But he just was impressed that they




In 2005, the state of North Carolina was preparing to effectively
evict payday lenders from its borders.2 CBS correspondent Scott
Pelly traveled to the state to report on the effort by interviewing
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1. Need to Know on PBS: Gary Rivlin on the High Cost of Poverty (PBS television
broadcast May 18,2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/
economy/ video-gary-rivlin-on-the-high-cost-of-poverty.
2. GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC. - HOW THE
WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 227 (2010).
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several persons involved in the overarching lending industry,
speaking with lenders and borrowers alike.3 During the course of
these interviews, the CEO of the State Employee's Credit Union of
North Carolina, Jim Blaine, told Pelly that if someone was
considering borrowing a payday loan he would recommend that he
or she see a loan shark instead because "[t]hey're cheaper" as they
only charge "an [annual percentage rate] of around 150%."4
This backhanded endorsement for loan sharks is
understandable in the context of the larger picture: in states without
payday lending protections and even in states with only minor
protections, payday lenders may charge two to three times as much
as Blaine's hypothetical loan shark. Although payday lenders do not
break the legs of their borrowers, their mere presence harms
individual borrowers and the communities they reside in by
trapping both in unnecessary and excessive debt, which lasts far
longer than advertised. The cycle of debt perpetuated by payday
lenders diminishes the resources that borrowers and communities
are able to put toward meeting basic needs, and thus perpetuates
poverty in the neighborhoods that these lenders target. As one of
the many states that permit payday lenders to both charge
astoundingly high annual percentage rates (hereinafter "APR") and
prolong the repayment of debt through rollover loans, California has
failed to protect its citizens from the dangers of payday lending.
In this Note, I will discuss various aspects of payday lending. In
Part I, I will explain what a payday loan is; compare how the product
is advertised to the reality; and how these loans impact individual
borrowers and their communities. Part II provides the national
context of payday lending at federal, state, and local government
levels. Part II touches briefly on issues faced in California, but in Part
III I will provide a more exhaustive treatment of the current state of
California payday lending. In Part IV, I will suggest how California
local governments can use targeted transparency disclosures to better
inform their citizens as to the consequences of borrowing a payday
loan in order to discourage the practice.
3. RiVLIN, supra note 2, at 227.
4. Id. at 228.
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I. What is a Payday Loan?5
In order to properly discuss why more stringent regulation of
the payday lending industry is imperative to protecting the financial
wellbeing of California residents, it is necessary to first explain what
a payday loan is.
A. Marketing vs. Reality
As a society, we are generally aware that the manner in which a
product is advertised can be drastically different from how it will
function in reality. For example, television advertisements for wrinkle
creams tend to show miraculous transitions from faces plagued with
conspicuous wrinkles, to those devoid of any and all "blemishes" upon
application of the advertised product. However, few to none believe
such a product can actually get rid of wrinkles. Although such smoke
and mirrors may be considered harmful, the difference between
marketing and reality in the payday lending context is more insidious.
The former may impact a user's self-image, but the deception of payday
lenders has a lasting impact on a person's finances and primarily
targets those who are already especially vulnerable.
6
Payday lending businesses advertise their product as a small
dollar amount, short-term loan intended for unexpected expenses,
"like a car repair or [an] emergency medical need." 7 However, it is
5. Throughout the time I have spent researching and writing this Note, I have discussed
my topic-perhaps ad nauseam-with family, friends, fellow law students, professors, and
practicing attorneys. At the least, all recognized the name of one of the biggest lenders in the
industry, Check Into Cash. However, most had only a vague and negative impression of
check cashing, and were unfamiliar with the concept of payday lending. With the exception
of a few attorneys and a professor that specialize in consumer debt matters, and the professor
that supervised this Note, no one I spoke with knew the specifics of what a payday loan was
or why consumer advocacy groups consider these loans predatory. Unless you, reader, have
watched John Oliver's witty and scathing segment on the payday lending industry, it is likely
you are similarly unfamiliar with this abusive practice. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver
(HBO television broadcast Aug. 10, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
PDylgzybWAw.
6. WEI Li, LESLIE PARRISH, KEITH ERNST & DELVIN DAVIS, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, PREDATORY PROFILING: THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LOCATION OF
PAYDAY LENDERS IN CALIFORNIA 23 (Mar. 26,2009), available at http://www.responsible
lending.org/california/ca-payday/research-analysis/predatory-profiling.pdf (stating that
"[t]he design and marketing of payday loans appeal to the preferences and fears of the
underbanked").
7. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS,
WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY 4 (July 2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcsassets/2012/PewPaydayLendingReportpdf.pdf
(stating that "opponents claim that the practice preys on overburdened people"); Payday
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evident that "the payday lending market does not function as
advertised." 8 The Pew Charitable Trust found that although these
short-term loans are marketed as two-week credit products, payday
loan borrowers are more likely to be indebted to lenders for
approximately five months of the year,9 taking out an average of
eight loans during that period. 10 Other estimates suggest that it may
take much longer than five months for borrowers to repay loans
taken from payday lenders. The Center for Responsible Lending
found that the typical payday borrower remains in debt for 212 days
of the year, or approximately seven months." Further indication of
the true price borrowers pay is the fact that only 2% of borrowers
pay their loan in full when it first comes due.12 The remaining 98%
are repeat customers. 13
The success of the payday lender business model is largely
dependent on return customers, 4 so lenders structure their loans to
ensure that a vast majority of borrowers become ensnared in a
repeating cycle of debt.15 Several analysts, employed by payday
lenders, have concluded that repeat customers, also known as
"rollovers," 16 are integral to generating a profit.17 In November 2013,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau "issued a report...
finding that four out of five payday loans are rolled over or renewed
within the 14 days" that the loan comes due.18 A former manager of
Lending: How a Short-Term Loan Becomes Long-Term Debt, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
8. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 2; see also CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, supra note 7.
9. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 4.
10. Id.
11. Fast Facts - Payday Loans, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.




14. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 4.
15. Sen. Jackson, S.B. 515 REFORMING PAYDAY LOANS (Mar. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/ califomia/ca-payday/policy-legislation/sb-515-
fact-sheet.pdf.
16. What Does it Mean to Renew or Roll Over a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1573/what-does-it-
mean-renew-or-roll-over-payday-loan.html (stating that "[g]enerally, it means you pay a
fee to delay paying back the loan. This fee does not reduce the amount you owe. If you
roll over the loan multiple times, it's possible to pay several hundred dollars in fees and
still owe the amount you borrowed... Some payday lenders give borrowers the option
to roll over [sic] their loans if they cannot afford to make the payment when it's due.
However, many states limit or ban payday loan rollovers.").
17. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 226-27.
18. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB Finds Four Out of Five Payday Loans Are Rolled
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Check 'n Go, a payday lender, noted that although she occasionally
saw new customers enter her store, she spent most of her time giving
loans to the same customers.19 These repeat borrowers often renew
their loan multiple times because they are forced to borrow again in
order to repay the initial loan that brought them to the lender in the
first place, and the exorbitant interest it spawns. 20 The same former
Check 'n Go manager often saw customers "pinball" between the
other payday lenders that began to crop up around her location.
21
Although the manager did not directly witness her customers taking
out loans at the neighboring payday lending stores,22 it is highly
probable they were, because the terms of these loans often force
borrowers to shuffle their debt from one payday lender to another,
only deepening their debt and the need for a subsequent loan.
23
Also contrary to advertisement, the primary reason borrowers take
out the initial loan is to pay for basic necessities, rather than to cover
the cost of an unexpected emergency.
24
Additionally, there is evidence suggesting that at least some
payday lenders, "de-emphasize the importance of the annual
percentage rate of the loan."25 Although payday lenders may be
required under state and federal law to provide borrowers with
notices about fees and interest rates, 26 California residents surveyed
by the Center for Responsible Lending in 2009 either were unable to
recall the APR of their loan or stated a dramatically lower APR
closer to the 20 to 30% APR of a credit card.27 The notices required
by California- despite requiring payday lenders list the triple-digit
APR-downplay the consequence of the APR to the borrower.
28
Over Or Renewed (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-
finds-four-out-of-five-payday-loans-are-rolled-over-or-renewed.
19. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 194.
20. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 4; CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-payday/ (last visited Mar. 5,2013).
21. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 193-94.
22. Id. at 194.
23. Id. at 195 (recounting how a customer confessed to borrowing from multiple
places); Need to Know on PBS, supra note 1.
24. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 5.
25. LI ET AL., supra note 6, at 23.
26. Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(d) (2004); Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(e) (2004) (requiring
payday lenders to give borrower information required by the federal Truth In Lending
Act); Christopher L. Peterson, "Warning: Predatory Lender" - A Proposal for Candid
Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 917 (2012) (indicating that
when possible payday lenders prefer to put the percentage of the loan principle instead
of the APR).
27. LI ET AL., supra note 6, at 23.
28. Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(d) (2004).
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For example, see California's notice requirement:
Amount Fee Amount 14-day 30-day
Provided of Check APR APR
$100 XX XXX XXX XXX
$200 XX XXX XXX XXX
29
Since the California notice requirement does not obligate payday
lenders to include APR based on the average time it takes a borrower
to repay the loan-as explained earlier, this ranges between five to
seven months-this notice furthers the payday lender's false
advertising efforts discussed above.30 By only requiring the payday
lender to include APR for 14-day and 30-day loans, a California
borrower may be more inclined to believe that what he or she is
contracting for is in fact a short-term loan that can realistically be paid
back in two weeks or, at the latest, a month, while still only incurring
limited fees. Savvy payday lenders have also been known to
manipulate the notice requirement by giving the appearance that the
lender will charge the same amount for each loan despite how long it
takes to repay, which they accomplish by basing their calculations on
a hypothetical loan repaid in two weeks (and keeping that
information in fine print).31 The result is that both the 14-day and 30-
day loans have the same "fee amount," or interest based cost, and the
APR for the 30-day loan is deceptively reduced from 460% to
214.74%.32 This infers that, whether the borrower repays within 14
days or 30 days, the loan will cost the same. In reality, the longer a
borrower takes to repay a loan, the more it will cost to repay because
the interest continues to accumulate and drives the "fee amount" up.
Since Americans have generally poor financial literacy, and are
more inclined to pay attention to dollar amounts than interest rates, 33
a borrower may only look at the deceptively low fees given by the
payday lender,34 which are listed in dollar amounts, and ignore what
the APR implicates for failing to repay within 14 days. Accordingly,
even if a borrower attempts to be fiscally responsible in determining
the true cost before taking out the payday loan, he or she will likely
29. Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(d)(2).
30. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 4; CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
supra note 11; Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(d)(2) (2004).
31. California Cash Advances, CHECK INTO CASH, http://checkintocash.com/cali
fornia-payday-loans (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
32. Id.
33. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 903-
04 (2007).
34. See California Cash Advances, supra note 31.
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focus on the dollar amount of the fees listed, and assume it factors in
the APR and actual length of the loan. Therefore, the borrower is
highly unlikely to see the true cost of the loan and is therefore
unable to make an informed borrowing decision.
In states that have yet to pass interest rate caps, the APR of payday
loans in is well within the triple digits.35 According to the Center for
Responsible Lending, the APR of a typical payday loan in America lies
between 391% to 521%.36 The average APR of these unregulated
payday loans is 400%.37 In a white paper the United States Post Office
(hereinafter "USPS"), relying on a study conducted by the Pew
Charitable Trust, placed the average APR slightly lower at 391%.38
Additionally, it takes an average of four and a half months for
Americans to repay the average payday loan of $375.39 During those
four and a half months, the borrower accumulates $520 in interest and
fees alone.40 Accordingly, the total cost of borrowing a $375 payday loan
with an APR of 391% is $895. This is almost 2.4 times the amount of the
original loan; the payments being exacted like blood from a stone when
the payee is in dire financial circumstances. 41 The average APR for
California payday loans has been calculated to be between 459%42 and
460%.43 This means that California residents are paying more for their
"short-term" loans than the average American payday borrower.
By paying the exorbitant costs that naturally result from high
APR, borrowers are forced to redirect funds they would otherwise
use for necessities, such as childcare, groceries, and utilities.44 The
irony being that the primary reason borrowers take out payday
loans is to pay for those same necessities. 45 Borrowers have proven
35. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 11.
36. Id.
37. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7.
38. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U. S. POSTAL SERV., PROVIDING NON-BANK





41. CrR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7 (explaining that "[w]ith each loan
renewal or flip, borrowers become unable to both repay the lender and have enough money
left until the next payday arrives. The trap of recyded debt is also how billions are taken each
year from poor people.").
42. CA Payday Overview, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsible
lending.org/california/ca-payday (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
43. Tim Lohrentz, Tools for Advocates of Limiting Payday Lending: How Your
Community Can Limit Payday Lending Through Municipal Land-Use and Other Ordinances,
INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV. 2 (June 2013).
44. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7.
45. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 5.
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themselves resourceful because, despite extreme financial hardship
and having to forgo basic necessities, on average they are able to
extricate themselves from payday debt for approximately half the
year.46 However, this is unlikely to indicate an improvement in a
borrower's financial status. Rather, it is probably due to payday
lending industry's use of ruthless tactics to incentivize their past due
borrowers to complete repayment.
For example, employees at the Check 'n Go referenced earlier,
as well as those in other Ohio locations, were instructed to call late
borrowers at least three times a day in attempt to collect an
outstanding loan balance. 47 When that did not work, the employee
would call the three people the borrower was required to list as
references when he or she took out the loan.48 If the borrower was still
late with payment, the employee started calling the borrowers'
workplace. 49  Sometimes Check 'n Go employees would even
physically visit the workplaceso Next, an employee would visit the
borrower's home and, if the borrower was out or neglected to answer
the door, the employee would leave a door hanger specifying the
amount of the debt he or she owed Check 'n Go.51 Sometimes the
employee would even knock on neighbors' doors asking when the
borrower would be at home.5 2
Chris Browning, a former Check 'n Go manager who was required
to make these calls during the course of her employment and testified
about the realities of payday lending to the Ohio state legislature,
described the collection practices as "torture" and "no holds barred."5 3
According to her, the purpose of these practices was to embarrass
borrowers into paying.54 Terrence Jent, a former regional director for
Check 'n Go, confirmed these practices when he testified to the Ohio
State legislature about his four years in the industry, calling the
methods harassing and embarrassing.55 Furthermore, Jent thought the
goal behind the visits to borrowers' homes was to show the borrower
that the payday lender knew where they lived,5 6 which implies that
payday lenders may also extort payment through intimidation.
46. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 11.
47. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 193.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 259.
51. Id. at 193, 259.
52. Id. at 193.
53. Id. at 257, 193.
54. Id. at 193.
55. Id. at 258-59.
56. Id. at 258.
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Even after a borrower extricates him or herself from the cycle of
payday loan debt, lenders continue to contact former customers with
the purpose of trying to entice them into taking out a new loans.57
One of the owners of Check 'n Go, Jared Davis, admitted that it was
company policy to contact former customers that had not visited a
location in 60 days to attempt to convince him or her to come back
and take out a new loan.
58
Such predatory tactics make it critical to protect the individuals
and communities being targeted by payday lenders. When payday
lenders incentivize individual borrowers to prolong the cycle of their
debt, lenders also create an avenue to spread their product to the
surrounding community. In addition to de-emphasizing the APR of
the loan 59 and thereby prey on a borrower's lack of financial literacy
and inability to adequately weigh the risks, 60 lenders further
encourage borrowers deeper into a cycle of debt by offering the
borrower discounts on future loans and other incentives for referring
family and friends.61 For payday lenders, this rewards system has
the dual benefit, of aiding in the retention of rollover customers they
continue to earn profit from, 62 as well as allowing the lender to insert
themself into the borrower's internal network, and further expand
their customer base.63 Although a borrower's most common reason
for picking a particular payday lending location is based on seeing
the storefront, 64 it is probable a potential borrower would be
persuaded to choose between locations and companies based upon a
family member or friend's referral.
The industry practice of using aggressive debt collection methods
to pressure borrowers into taking out subsequent loans persist today.
On July 10, 2014, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(hereinafter "CFPB") filed a consent order, fining ACE Cash Express,
Inc. (hereinafter "ACE") $10,000,000 for its "unfair, deceptive, and
abusive" debt collection practices.65 According to the consent order
"ACE's collections training manuals instructed its collectors to
57. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 196.
58. Id. at 197.
59. LI ET AL., supra note 6, at 23.
60. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WELL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 33 (2007).
61. LI ET AL., supra note 6, at 23.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 7.
65. Consent Order at 1, 17, 22, ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 2014-CFPB-0008
(C.F.P.B. July 10, 2014), available at http://files.Consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_
consent-order ace-cash-express.pdf.
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'create a sense of urgency' for consumers in default" and used that
urgency to pressure borrowers to payoff the existing loan by taking
out a new one.66 They did so by excessively calling homes, work, and
cell numbers; disclosing the debt to non-liable third parties; and
illegally failing to abide by consumer requests to cease collection
activities.67  In-house collectors lied to borrowers about the
consequences of letting accounts go to collections.68 Some in-house and
third-party collectors threatened borrowers with lawsuits or criminal
prosecution.69  The CFPB found that ACE's methods "took
unreasonable advantage of the inability of consumers to protect their
own interests in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service." 70 It is doubtful that Check 'n Go and ACE are alone in their
tactics. More likely, many (if not all) payday lenders use similar tactics
to keep their borrowers in a cycle of industry-profiting debt.
In addition to being pressured by predatory tactics, borrowers
may be tempted to return to payday lenders because they have been
forced to forgo basic necessities in order to pay their loan along with
its exorbitant rates and fees71 and need a new loan to cover their cost
of living. Analogously, once inundated with payday loans, it is
difficult to free a community from the grip of these institutions and
their predatory tactics without completely banning payday lending.
Unfortunately, and as I will discuss in more detail below, issues of
preemption make it nearly impossible for California local
governments to ban payday lenders within their borders. 72
B. How to Calculate an Annual Percentage Rate
As shown above, the APR attached to a loan has a significant
impact on the actual cost of a payday loan,73 especially since it is
highly unlikely a borrower can repay the loan and its related costs
within the two weeks advertised.74 Therefore, it can be helpful to
understand how to calculate APR. Since this Note focuses on
California payday loans, I will use the equation provided by Tim
66. Consent Order, ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (C.F.P.B. July 10,
2014), supra note 65, at 4, 7.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 5-6.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Peterson, supra note 26, at 927-28; PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 5.
72. Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 17.
73. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 38, at 13 figure 6; CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, supra note 42; Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 2.
74. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 11.
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Lohrentz in his article on regulating California payday lenders
through local government land-use ordinances
75:
BASIC EQUATION FOR APR: simple interest X number of terms per year
SIMPLE INTEREST: $45 interest on $255 loan = 17.65% interest (45/225)
TERMS PER YEAR: 365.25 days per year by 14-day minimum term = 26.09 (365.25/14)
CALIFORMA APR: simple interest (17.65%) X number of terms per year (26.09) =
460% 76
USPS provides a similar equation, resulting in a lower
nationwide average APR of 390%. 7 This may be due to factoring in
the twenty states and the District of Columbia, which have instituted
regulations -through legislative action and voter initiatives- that
cap the APR payday lenders can charge.78
C. Vulnerable Communities
In its Civil Code, the Legislature of the State of California
memorialized an acknowledgment that its low-income citizens are
especially affected by payday loans. Their acknowledgment states
that while "[t]he ability to obtain and use credit has become of great
importance to consumers... [c]ertain advertising and business
practices of some credit services organizations have worked
financial hardship upon the people of this state, often those who are
of limited economic means and inexperienced in credit matters." 79
As inferred in the Civil Code above, low-income communities
are especially vulnerable to payday lending institutions because a
natural consequence of impoverishment is a lack of resources; bad
credit can prevent people from opening a bank account with a
traditional banking institution, which is more aggressively regulated
than the payday lending industry, and therefore has more
reasonable APRs and fees. Another important factor is that
Americans in general have problems with financial literacy and
assessing risk.U As Professor Christopher Peterson noted in his law
review article on payday lending and municipal ordinances, the
Department of Education recently found in a national survey that
22% of American adults lack "even the most basic quantitative
75. Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 2.
76. Id.
77. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 38, at 13 figure 6.
78. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 11.
79. Cal. Civ. Code § 1789.11(a).
80. FUNG ET AL., supra note 60, at 33; Peterson, supra note 26, at 911-12.
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literacy skills."81 The lack of financial literacy is worsened by all
consumers' general approach to weighing risks. Overall, people
tend to overestimate the risks of unlikely events, like plane crashes,
while underestimating the risks of common events that are more
likely to affect them, like the risk of cancer inherent in smoking
cigarettes and the risk of death or injury associated with speeding in
an automobile.8 2
When a borrower initially takes out a loan, he or she is usually
"hopelessly optimistic" about their ability to repay that loan, despite
any past negative experiences.83 In general, when making risk-related
decisions, people do not seek out additional information about the
risks.84 Furthermore, consumers often underestimate or ignore the
long-term drawbacks of risky ventures and prefer to focus on the
present benefits.85 In the case of payday loans, potential borrowers
are more likely to focus on their pressing need for the loan -which is
usually purchased to pay for basic necessities8 6- and understandably
disregard the seemingly minor future risks and costs associated with
repaying it. Adding the "abstract nature of financial pricing," like an
APR, into the mix makes it even more difficult for consumers to assess
risks and maintain control over their finances. 87
Borrowers often do not accurately weigh the risks associated
with payday loans because the consequences will take place in the
future whereas the financial need is immediate. 88 Payday lenders'
own studies show that the industry relies on rollover loans to make a
profit8 9- "rollover" meaning when borrowers pay off a loan by
rolling it into a subsequent one-which means the industry is
inclined to encourage borrowers to underestimate or ignore the
consequences of their borrowing decision.90 On the surface, it is
easier for the borrower- especially those suffering from emotional
distress (e.g., urgent financial concerns), embarrassment,
desperation, or fear-to disregard the fact that the consequence of
rolling over a loan is often a dramatic increase in debt.91 This
81. Peterson, supra note 26, at 916-17.
82. FUNG ET AL., supra note 60, at 33.
83. Peterson, supra note 26, at 911-13.
84. FUNG ET AL., supra note 60, at 33.
85. Peterson, supra note 26, at 913.
86. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7, at 5.
87. Peterson, supra note 26, at 912-13.
88. Id. at 914.
89. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 226.
90. Peterson, supra note 26, at 915.
91. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 195 (former customer confessed to former Check 'n Go
location manager about the enormity of his debt).
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disregard exacerbates the borrowers' inability to meaningfully
weigh the consequences. 92
The mere access to a payday lending institution increases the
likelihood that a person will borrow a payday loan.93 In the study he
published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Brian Melzer compared
similarly composed families living in a state which had banned payday
loans, but shared a border with a state that permitted them." 94 Families
that had access to payday loans because they were close to the
neighboring state reported increased hardship.95 These families were
25% more likely to report having difficulty in paying their bills.96
Additionally, they reported having to skip meals, forego telephone
access, and postpone medical care.97
The presence of payday lending institutions in a community has
impacts beyond increasing a family's financial hardships. Professor
Peterson cites a study conducted in Seattle, which found that "a greater
density of payday-lending locations causes an increase in local crime
rates."98 Tim Lohrentz also notes that research indicates that there is a
correlation between the presence of payday loan institutions and higher
crime rates. 99 In a 2009 study, the Center for Responsible Lending
found that the clustering of payday lending institutions in California
was a significant drain on African-American and Latino communities'
economic resources. These California communities paid $247 million
for payday loan fees alone instead of putting those resources toward
supporting their basic needs.100 This drain on the local economies
contributed to foreclosures, loss of equity, and diminished property
values.101 Considering the increased financial hardship and higher
crime rates associated with the presence of payday lending institutions,
it is understandable that Professor Peterson concludes that although
"the social science is by no means unanimous, the best evidence
suggests that small, high-cost loans are harmful to their borrowers and
92. Peterson, supra note 26, at 915.
93. Id. at 927.
94. Id. at 927-28.
95. Id. at 928.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 927-28.
98. Id. at 929.
99. Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 23.
100. LI ET AL., supra note 6, at 24; RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 289 (An Ohio based non-profit
was unable to find such a correlation); Id. at 307-08 (Consumer advocate in Ohio firmly
believed in the correlation due to seeing a remarkably higher amount of foreclosures in
African-American neighborhoods, which were inundated with payday lending
institutions); Id. at 319 (Alan Greenspan acknowledged in 2002 that subprime lenders were
targeting specific communities).
101. LI ET AL., supra note 6, at 25.
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
to their communities on balance." 102
The Center for Responsible Lending found in a study it
conducted in 2009 that these harmful effects are disproportionately
felt in minority communities. 03 African Americans and Latinos
constituted over half of payday lending borrowers, despite making
up about a third of California's overall payday loan eligible adult
population.10 4 Whites accounted for only 36% of payday loan
borrowers, despite representing 44.5% of the payday loan eligible
adult population.105 In fact, the presence of payday lenders in areas
with the largest African-American and Latino populations is almost
eight times greater than in White neighborhoods. 10 6
The payday lending industry claims that the reason its locations
are more prominent in minority neighborhoods is to serve areas
neglected by banks and credit unions.10 7 However, the Center for
Responsible Lending's study proved this underlying rationale false.
The difference in presence of bank and credit union branches in
African-American and Latino neighborhoods as compared to White
neighborhoods is slight to the point of irrelevancy 08 and most likely
due to banks favoring commercial areas.109 Accordingly, the Center for
Responsible Lending believes payday lenders have a less than altruistic
motive for concentrating in minority neighborhoods. Instead of trying
to serve communities ignored by banks and credit unions, payday
lenders are "exploit[ing] the preferences and fears of underbanked"
African-American and Latino households.""' Their study noted that
the underbanked -those who have checking accounts but regularly use
payday loans -may be choosing payday loans over traditional banking
products because: (1) the concentration of payday lending institutions
makes them more conveniently located than banks and credit unions,
(2) unlike traditional financial institutions, payday lenders approve
loans for almost all applicants with checking accounts, and (3) payday
loans have comparative "seemingly clear pricing."1
12
102. Peterson, supra note 26, at 929-30.
103. Li ET AL., supra note 6, at 4, 25.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id. at 13.
109. Id. at 20.
110. Id. at 50 n.18 (defining "underbanked" as referring to someone who, despite
having a checking account, "regularly use[s] alternative products and services such as
check cashing and payday loans.").
111. Id. at 6.
112. Id. at 23.
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In addition to clustering in neighborhoods with higher minority
populations, payday lenders are unsurprisingly also overwhelmingly
located in low-income neighborhoods. 113 Accordingly, it is probable
that low-income communities with greater minority population are
especially burdened by the clustering of payday lenders.
When crafting legislation to regulate payday lending, it is
imperative that legislative drafters keep in mind which communities
are most vulnerable -where payday lenders are most likely to
cluster -so the drafters can afford these communities the protections
needed. While it is probable that payday lenders presently target
the same vulnerable communities, the Center for Responsible
Lending's study referenced earlier was published in 2009,114 it would
be prudent for those drafting legislation to rely on more current data
in their legislative efforts. As the non-profit organization "that has
taken the lead against predatory lending in its various forms,"" 5 the
Center for Responsible Lending may be the best place to start.
Otherwise, drafters can rely on the sources used for the 2009 study:
the State of California Department of Corporations, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the United States Census.
116
II. Post-Deregulation and Subsequent Reform
After the incursion of payday lenders into the states that have
deregulated their usury laws,117 there has been substantial reform at
all levels of government: national, state, and local governments." 8 In
Part III of this Note, I will discuss California in detail, including the
current laws that govern the State's lending and attempts to reform
its past deregulation of the State Constitution's usury laws.119 To
understand California's past and possible future attempts at reform,
it is important to view it in the broader federal context.
113. Li ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
114. Li ET AL., supra note 6.
115. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 50.
116. Li ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
117. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (7th ed. 2001) (explaining that in modem law
the term "usury" refers to unlawful interest rates, which exceed maximums set by law).
118. See generally The Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006); Creola Johnson,
Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians From Payday Lending?,
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 649 (2012); Oneshia Herring, Remarks, CFPB Field Hearing on
Payday, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.responsible
lending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/OH-Remarks-CFPB-Field-
Hearing-Payday-FINAL.pdf; Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 21-22.
119. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1; see infra Part II.
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A. Federal
1. Current Federal Laws and Issues of Jurisdiction
With few overarching federal laws regulating payday lenders,
the task has largely fallen to the states and their usury laws. With
consumer advocates in Congress, such as Senator Elizabeth Warren
of Massachusetts, overarching federal regulation may not be as far
off as it once seemed. Currently, there are few federal statutes that
apply to the payday lending industry, but there is some growing
federal agency regulation. One of the relevant federal statutes is the
Truth in Lending Act,120 which imposes disclosure requirements
regarding fees that states have incorporated into their laws.
1 21
The most clearly protective federal action to date took place on
October 17, 2006. On that day Congress codified protections for
members of the military against excessive payday loan rates, which
were to take effect the subsequent year.122 This law became known
as the Military Lending Act (hereinafter "MLA").23 Subsequent
amendments in 2013 added additional disclosure requirements, 124
but the MLA has otherwise remained largely unaltered. The core
protection afforded to members of the military by the MLA is a
nationwide restriction on charging excessive interest rates: when a
member of the military is extended credit, the "creditor ... may not
impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36%" on
the member or their dependents.125 This applies to various types of
consumer loans, including payday loans. 126 Congress has yet to
extend this 36% cap on payday loan APRs to civilians.
27
The largest and most impactful federal statute since the
enactment of the MLA was the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010.128 Professor Johnson recounted that when the MLA was
passed "[i]n the wake of the mortgage foreclosure crisis" it
"create[d] a new federal agency.., to focus on protecting consumers
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (1968).
121. See, e.g., Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(e) (2004).
122. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006); see also Editor's and Reviser's Notes for 10 U.S.C. § 987.
123. Johnson, supra note 118, at 649.
124. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).
125. 10 U.S.C. § 987(a)-(b).
126. Johnson, supra note 118, at 649.
127. See generally, Johnson, supra note 118 (discussing how the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau has the authority to protect civilians in a manner similar to the MLA).
128. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641 (2010).
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in the credit market place." 129 The agency charged with protecting
consumer credit was the CFPB.130 The CFPB's self-expressed mission
"is to make markets for consumer financial products and services
work for Americans -whether they are applying for a mortgage,
choosing among credit cards, or using any number of other
consumer financial products." 131 Along with educating the public
132
and studying the financial market, 33 the CFPB also "enforce[s]
federal consumer financial laws." 34 The enforcing arm of the CFPB
enables the agency to bring lawsuits and administrative actions
against illegal payday lending.
135
Due to matters of jurisdiction, the regulation of online payday
lenders that are based in tribal territories is complicated, particularly
with regard to who can sue and where the suit should take place.
The CFPB and Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter "FTC") have
both pursued actions against lenders based in tribal territories, and
the resulting jurisdictional splits among District Courts show that
this issue has yet to be conclusively resolved. 136 Adam Mayle has
already written an in depth analysis of tribal territory based payday
lenders and the federal preemption issues this raises, 137 so I will not
attempt to elaborate further on this complex area.
129. Johnson, supra note 118, at 649 (emphasis removed).
130. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.1 (2011).
131. About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
the-bureau/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
132. I Need Money Now. Should I Get a Payday Loan? What Other Options Should I
Consider?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerFinance.gov/askcfpb/
1583/i-need-money-now-should-i-get-payday-loan-what-other-options-should-i-
consider.html (updated Nov. 6, 2013) (discouraging the use of payday loans).
133. Herring, supra note 118.
134. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 131.
135. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cashcall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167 (D. Mass. filed
Dec. 16, 2013), available at http://files.consumerFinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb-complaint_
cashcall.pdf; See also 11 U.S.C. § 548; Consent Order, ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 2014-
CFPB-0008 (C.F.P.B. July 10, 2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407
_cfpb_.consent-order ace-cash-express.pdf.
136. Colorado v. Western Sky Fin., LLC., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Colo., 2011);
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Payday Fin., LLC., 935 F. Supp. 2d 926 (D.S.D., 2013); Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cashcall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167 (D. Mass. filed Dec. 16, 2013),
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb-complaint-cashcall.pdf.
137. See generally Adam Mayle, Note, Usury on the Reservation: Regulation of Tribal-
Affiliated Payday Lenders, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1053, 1075-76 (2012) (discussing
online payday lending in tribal territories and the federal preemption issues it raises).
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2. Recent and Impactful Federal Agency Actions
Since November 2013 there have been three federal agency actions
that have particularly impacted the future of payday lending. When
the Center for Responsible Lending published its paper on the state of
lending in September 2013, six major banks and credit unions were
offering their own payday loan product with an APR "ranging from
225% to 300%."138 This product was marketed as a "direct deposit
advance service." 139 On November 21, 2013, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (hereinafter "FDIC"), which oversees banks,
issued a press release and guidance co-authored by the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency (hereinafter "OCC"), which expressed the
FDIC and OCC's concerns about direct deposit advance products and
their intention to implement new supervision requirements. 40 In the
light of impending federal scrutiny, Regions Bank, which is actually
regulated by the Federal Reserve, not the FDIC, announced it was
discontinuing its payday loan program.141 Two days later Fifth Third
Bank, also regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, made a similar
announcement, and so did Wells Fargo and US Bank, who are both
regulated by the FDIC and OCC.4 2 This does not appear to have had
an immediate impact on traditional storefront payday lending or its
online incarnation, but it does demonstrate that federal involvement is
powerful, and when leveraged correctly, may be an effective tool in
putting a halt to abusive lending practices.
The second potentially influential, as well as surprising, agency
action is a proposal by USPS. For years, payday lenders have been
justifying their high APR product as providing loans to high-risk
customers who, due to bad credit, might not be able to borrow
138. Rebecca Borne & Peter Smith, Bank Payday Lending: The State of Lending in
America & its Impact on U.S. Households, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 2 (Sept. 2013),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/bank-payday-loans/.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Issues Final Guidance Regarding
Deposit Advance Products (Nov. 21, 2013), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/2013/pr13105.htm; Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Guidance on
Supervisory Concerns and Expectations Regarding Deposit Advance Products (Nov. 21,
2013), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/pr13105a.pdf.
141. Press Release, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Regions Bank Discontinues Debt-Trap
Payday Loans (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-
releasesarchives/Regions-Bank-Discontinues-Debt-Trap-Payday-Loans.htnil.
142. Press Release, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Wells Fargo, US Bank, and Fifth
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elsewhere.143 Payday lenders bolster this argument with the fact that
there are few to no alternatives to their product 44 and claim that the
high APR is necessary because lending to their target demographic of
customers with bad credit presents a high risk.145 This is a valid
concern, which USPS proposed a solution for in its recent white
paper.146 USPS proposes that it could "offer non-bank financial
services," including "small loans that would help customers
overcome unexpected expenses." 147  The paper provides a
comparative breakdown of the national average costs of payday loans
verses USPS's suggested alternative program.148 For a $375 loan, an
average payday lender attaches an APR of 391%, whereas USPS
suggests a significantly lower APR of 28%.149 Relying on the Pew
Charitable Trust, the Postal Service claims it takes an average of 4.5
months for a borrower to repay a loan from a payday lender and
would take 5.5 months to repay its proposed alternative small-dollar
loan. 50 Taking the USPS's figures at face value, this boils down to
payday lenders charging $520 in interest and fees on top of the original
$375 loan and the Postal Service charging only $48 in interest and
fees.15' The proposal has garnered support from Senator Warren and
the public at large,152 which may help push the payday alternative
from the white paper into the green world of finance.
The most recent agency action is the CFPB's administrative
proceeding against ACE Cash Express, LLC.153 As discussed in Part
I, the CFPB fined ACE for its unfair, deceptive, and abusive debt
143. RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 30-31, 239.
144. S. 318, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013) (enacted); See also Need to Know on PBS, supra note 1
(Gary Rivlin discussing a payday loan alternative program in North Carolina).
145. See RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 327-28 (Mike Loftin explaining that "[tihe
underlying logic of subprime mortgagees and payday loans is the same: that the only
way to expand credit to minorities and lower-income people is to dumb-down credit
standards and charge them more for the added risk").
146. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 38.
147. Id. at ii.
148. Id. at 13 figure 6.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 38 at 13 figure 6.
152. See Emily Swanson, Elizabeth Warren's Postal Banking Idea Has Big Public Support,
New Poll Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/02/13/post-office-banking-_n_4776767.html (finding that a plurality of
Americans favor having the Postal Service offer basic financial services and that its
expansion into basic financial services would provide healthy competition").
153. Consent Order, ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (C.F.P.B. July 10,
2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407-cfpb-consent-orderace-
cash-express.pdf.
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collection practices, and ordered ACE to change those practices.
154
The risk of paying millions in fines will likely encourage other
lenders to curb similar behavior. However, the consent order does
not prevent ACE from keeping their delinquent borrowers in a
continuing cycle of debt. Although ACE employees may not overtly
encourage borrowers to pay off their loan with a new one, they can
inform the borrower of the possibility if the borrower asks. 155
Accordingly, while the CFPB has demonstrated its intention to hold
payday lenders accountable for their debt collection practices, such
litigation alone cannot grant borrowers the protections they need.
B. State and Local Governments
The Center for Responsible Lending recently testified to the
CFPB that "[n]ot a single state has legalized payday lending since
2005."156 Additionally, there is a trend among states against payday
lending, with 22 states prohibiting or restricting the payday lending
industry.157 Some of those states with regulations in place still
permit APRs in the triple digits or higher. 58  For example,
Washington State, which still permits high APRs,159 attempts to
protect its consumers by limiting the dollar amount and length of the
loan.160 The majority of the states regulating this type of lending
have instituted caps on APRs, the lowest being 17%.161 Georgia
explicitly prohibited payday lending and classified the practice as a
violation of its racketeering laws.162 Others less explicitly prohibit
the practice by repealing the laws created to authorize their presence
or allowing those laws to sunset.163 Despite prohibiting payday
lending, a state may experience difficulty in eradicating the practice
because storefront lenders may continue to practice illegally within
the state 64 and this does not prevent non-traditional online lenders
154. Consent Order, ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (C.F.P.B. July 10,
2014), supra note 153, at 11, 17, 22.
155. Id. at 13-14.
156. Herring, supra note 118.
157. Id.
158. Legal Status of Payday Loans by State, CONSUMER FED'N OF AMERICA, http://
www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
159. Id.
160. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7.
161. CONSUMER FED'N OF AMERICA, supra note 158.
162. Id.
163. Id.; See also RIVLIN, supra note 2, 104-15 (providing a history of the beginning of
the reform movement in North Carolina).
164. RiVLIN, supra note 2, at 315-16 (observing it took five years before all storefront
payday lenders left North Carolina).
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from marketing their product to its citizens from payday lending
friendly jurisdictions.
165
When Christopher Peterson published his article, "Warning:
Predatory Lender" - A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan
Ordinances," in 2012, "at least 135 local governments had attempted
to restrict, regulate, or otherwise arrest the development of usurious
lending within their boundaries." 166 Local ordinances have resulted
in varying degrees of success and failure because those creating the
ordinances must take into consideration issues of federal and state
preemption.167 For example, a Florida state trial court struck down
the city of Jacksonville's ordinance capping their APR at 36%,
because the judge found the ordinance was preempted by the state's
own APR cap of 300%.168 The city of St. Ann, Missouri tried a
different tactic by basing its ordinance in zoning laws as a way to
completely ban the presence of payday lenders in its borders.169 The
Supreme Court of Missouri struck down the ordinance also on
preemption grounds, because the state permitted the presence of
payday lenders and the ordinance would ban an activity allowed
under state law.170 So far the city of Dallas, Texas has survived a
preemption challenge to its penal ordinance,171 which includes the
following protections: capping payday loans at 20% of a borrower's
income, limiting the number of rollovers, allowing installment
payments, and fining lenders that violate the ordinance. 172
Typically, local governments rely on "their well-accepted power
to adopt zoning ordinances to stem the tide of payday... lending
within their jurisdictions." 173 According to Professor Peterson, local
governments typically implement three types of ordinances: "(1)
165. N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ncdoj.gov/Consumer/Credit-and-Loans/
Payday-Loans.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (stating that although "Attorney General
Roy Cooper helped outlaw storefront payday lenders in North Carolina . . . payday
lenders are still using the internet to offer [payday] loans. Internet payday loans are not
legally enforceable in our state, although some internet lenders who are based overseas
or on Indian reservations claim not to be subject to North Carolina law.").
166. Peterson, supra note 26, at 932.
167. Id. at 933.
168. Id. at 934-35 (citing case Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctr. of Fla., Inc. v.
Consol. City of Jacksonville, Fla., No. 16-2005-CA-7025-MA, slip op. at 2-3 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
June 1, 2006)).
169. Id. at 935.
170. Id. at 936 (citing case Sunshine Enter. of Mo. v. Bd. of Adjustment of St. Ann, 64
S.W.3d 310 (Mo. 2002)).
171. Consumer Serv. Alliance of Tex., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 433 S.W.3d 796, 809
(Tex. 2014).
172. DALL. CITY CODE, art. XI. § 50-151.3 (2011); Id. at § 50-146.
173. Peterson, supra note 26, at 936.
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restrictions on the location where predatory lenders can operate; (2)
discretional permits that restrict who may obtain licenses to engage
in predatory lending; and (3) permanent or temporary limits on the
number of predatory lending locations within a jurisdiction. " 174
Along with explaining how each type of ordinance operates,
Professor Peterson notes their specific weaknesses. 175 He states that
the distance limits (e.g., requiring payday lenders stay a specific
distance from schools), although "cosmetically appealing," are "too
small to impede the basic business model" of the payday lenders
and ironically "force" them to locate "in the poor, often minority
neighborhoods and strip malls that they wanted to operate in
anyway." 176 Furthermore, all three types of ordinances "provide
political cover for leaders who do not want to risk offending the
powerful predatory lobby" and are highly unlikely to help state-
wide reform campaigns. 177
The weakness Professor Peterson believes applies to all three
types of measures is that they "[provide] too little protection too
late," because by the time the measures are passed the jurisdictions
are saturated with payday lenders and the grandfather clauses that
most local governments feel compelled to create allow existing
payday lenders to stay in place.178 Permitting existing locations to
remain "cements the unsatisfactory development patterns in place
for the long term."1
79
III. Current State of Payday Lending in California
As previously stated in Part I, the average APR for a California
payday loan has been calculated to be between 459% to 460%.180 As a
result borrowers in California "lose more than $450 million every year
just to pay the fees on their... payday loans."181 In 2009, the Center for
Responsible Lending found that $247 million of the $450 million came
from the African-American and Latino communities payday lenders
prefer to cluster in.182 As discussed in Part I.C., payday lenders are
overrepresented and tend to cluster in California communities with
174. Peterson, supra note 26, at 937.
175. Id. at 937-40.
176. Id. at 939-40.
177. Id. at 940; See generally Lohrentz, supra note 43 (proposing local government
ordinances can be used to bolster larger reform efforts).
178. Peterson, supra note 26, at 939.
179. Id.
180. Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 2.
181. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 42.
182. Li ET AL., supra note 6, at 24.
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higher percentages of minority and low-income populations.
183
Therefore, it is predictable that these same communities are also
vulnerable to the California payday lending industry.
A. Reform Efforts
In April 2013, the California State Legislature considered Senate
Bill 515, which proposed to reform the payday lending industry
within the state. 84 The bill, introduced by Senator Jackson on
February 21, 2013, acknowledged that "the high price of a payday
loan" and the requirement "that it must be paid off in one lump sum
after only two weeks, virtually ensures that cash-strapped borrowers
will be unable to repay the loan and have enough left over to meet
their other basic needs." 185 This "debt trap" effectively forced the
majority of borrowers to "re-borrow before their next pay period to
make ends meet." 186 The bill proposed to better protect California
consumers by limiting individual borrowers to four loans per year;
giving borrowers 30 instead of just 14 days to repay; requiring
payday lenders to assess the borrower's ability to repay; allowing
borrowers to enter into installment repayment plans; and requiring
that payday lenders produce additional information to the California
Department of Corporations. 8 7 Despite not requiring a cap on the
state's triple-digit APR, the bill still failed. 88 After the payday
industry's success one of their lobbyists commented: "I do feel bad
that people have to go to the payday lending industry... [blut the
fact of the matter is, they help a lot of people in the state of
California." 189 To the best of my knowledge, at the time this Note
went to print, no new reform measures had been enacted.
The California State Legislature has authorized the creation of
small dollar loan pilot programs on at least two occasions. 190 Yet,
considering how much California residents still spend on payday
lending, the existence of these pilot programs does not appear to
have had a significant impact on payday lending in California. The
183. Li ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
184. Policy & Legislation, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsible
lending.org/califomia/ca-payday/policy-legislation (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
185. Sen. Jackson, supra note 15.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Karen de Sd, Payday Lenders Win Again in the State Legislature - No New Industry
Curbs on Horizon, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.mercurynews
.com/ci_23049163/payday-lenders-california-win-again-state-legislature-no.
189. Id.
190. S. 318, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013) (enacted); S. 1146, 2010 Leg. (Cal. 2010).
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ineffectiveness of these pilot programs may be due to management
issues, lack of publicity, the larger presence of payday lenders
throughout the state, or a combination thereof.
A recent and promising reform measure is the passage of Senate
Bill 896, which will be codified in the California Financial Code as
sections 22066 and 22067.191 Although the law has been approved by
Governor Brown it does not appear to have fully taken effect. 192 Once
the law does take effect, specially licensed non-profits will be able to
provide small dollar loans at 0% interest for a fixed set of reasonable
fees.193 The law is intended to help borrowers establish and build
their credit history, so the non-profit lenders understandably will be
required to provide the borrowers with credit education before
distributing the loan.194 After the law takes effect, non-profit lenders
will be able to provide a healthier alternative to payday loans. The
sustainability of the program and its effectiveness in diverting
borrowers from payday loans remains to be seen.
B. Overarching State Laws
The California Constitution has set usury laws.195 It sets per
annum interest rates to 7% for "loan[s] or forbearance[s] of any
money, goods, or things in action, or on accounts after demands" 196
and caps those interest rates at a maximum of 10% per annum.
197
Despite the additional language that "[n]o person, association,
copartnership or corporation shall.., receive from a borrower more
than the interest authorized by this section" and that "[t]he
provisions of this section shall supersede all provisions of this
Constitution and laws enacted thereunder in conflict therewith,"198
these State Constitutional protections have been interpreted to not
apply to payday lenders.1 99
Instead, "[s]ections 23000-23106 of the California Financial
Code... also known as the California Deferred Deposit Transaction
191. S. 896, 2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014) (enacted) (amending California's Financial Code to
add sections 22066 and 22067).
192. Id.
193. Id. at §§ 22066 (c), (c)(6)(G), (c)(6)(C)(i)-(iii).
194. Id. at § 22066 (a), (c)(7).
195. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (1879).
196. Id.
197. Id. at § 1(1)-(2).
198. Id. at § 1(2).
199. Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 17 (stating that "Article XV of the California
Constitution ... does not apply to deferred deposit (payday) lenders.").
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Law, govern the conduct of check cashers and payday lenders."
200
Section 23036 articulates that a payday lender's "fee for a deferred
deposition transaction shall not exceed 15% of the face amount of the
check." 201 Unlike Article 15 of the State Constitution, the text in
section 23036 does not say "per annum" so the 15% is simple interest,
which translates into the 459% to 460% APR discussed previously.
20 2
This section also allows payday lenders to tack on an additional $15
charge if a borrower's check bounces, 20 3 which is almost inevitable
considering the majority of borrowers are unable to repay the loan
when it comes due after 14 days.
204
Payday lenders operating in California are required to make
various financial disclosures to borrowers regarding their fees, some
of which are imported from the federal Truth in Lending Act.20 5 The
most visually apparent disclosure is to be posted "clearly and
conspicuously in the unobstructed view of the public" at each
payday lending institution "in letters not less than one-half inch in
height" along with a disclosure informing borrowers that they
cannot be criminally prosecuted for any potential debt.
206
Furthermore, payday lenders are required to provide a fee
schedule. 207 The suggested format is:
Amount Fee Amount 14-day 30-day
Provided of Check APR APR
$100 XX XXX XXX XXX
$200 XX XXX XXX XXX
20s
As discussed in Part I.A., although this format initially appears
helpful, payday lenders have found a way to manipulate the
disclosure in their favor and belie the actual cost of their product. For
example, the portion of Check Into Cash's website regarding its
California stores, the "Fee Amount" -essentially the cost of the
accumulated interest-of a $100 loan remains $17.65 whether its
borrowed for 14 or 30 days.209 Similarly, the fees for a $200 loan
200. Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 17.
201. Cal. Fin. Code § 23036(a) (2004).
202. See supra Part I.B. (providing a formula to calculate APR and simple interest).
203. Cal. Fin. Code § 23036(e) (2004).
204. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 11.
205. Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(c)-(f) (2004).
206. Id. at § 23035(d).
207. Id.
208. Id. at § 23035(d)(2).
209. CHECK INTO CASH, supra note 31.
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remain at $35.30 for the same time periods.210 This static fee amount
and the mysterious drop in the APR, which calculates to 460.16% for a
14-day term and lowers to 214.74% for a 30-day term, allows
borrowers to conclude Check Into Cash charges a flat fee. 211 It is only
after looking at the duller-colored fine print below stating that all of
their calculations are "[biased on a fourteen (14) day advance with
one (1) payment," that the deception becomes apparent 212: The real
APR for the alleged 30-day term loan is 460% and there is no flat fee.
In order to keep the cost at $17.65, the loan must be repaid within the
14-day term, otherwise the interest will build to envelope the
borrower in unexpected debt.
C. California Local Government Efforts
As we have seen, protective ordinances bear the risk of being
overturned due to preemption.213 Accordingly, local governments are
unable to pass the interest rate caps that would grant their citizens the
most protection. California local governments looking to protect their
citizenry from payday lending institutions located within their
jurisdictions could be well served to take the state laws discussed in
Part III, section B, into consideration.
To circumvent preemption concerns, many counties and cities in
California have instead passed land use ordinances, 214 which are
considered within the purview of local governments and not the
state.215 These types of ordinances include: short moratoriums on
new or relocating payday lenders while the local government
assesses the situation; bans on new institutions entering the
jurisdiction or specific neighborhoods; caps on the amount of
payday lenders in the jurisdiction; requirements that payday lenders
stay a specific distance from other payday lenders or "other sensitive
uses" such as schools and liquor stores; performance measures such
as hours of operation; conditional use permits; and zoning code
verification certificates. 216 These ordinances are prospective, and
typically have little to no effect on existing payday lending locations.
Even those that ban payday lenders from specific neighborhoods
210. CHECK INTO CASH, supra note 31.
211. Id.
212. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 42.
213. Peterson, supra note 26, at 934-36.
214. Lohrentz, supra note 43, at 21-22 (providing a table summarizing the
ordinances implemented by local governments in California to regulate payday lending).
215. Id. at 17 (stating that "local land use is a police power granted to local governments
rather than to states").
216. Id. at 17-18.
[Vol. 12
Winter 2015] PROTECTING CALIFORNIANS FROM PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 83
have little immediate effect, because the statutory scheme will often
include a problematic grandfather clause that allows the existing
institutions to remain.217 Accordingly, it is debatable how effective
land use ordinances are at protecting citizens, especially if the area
covered by the ordinance is already inundated with payday lenders,
which "has typically served as the political impetus for the
ordinance in the first place."
218
IV. Warning Signs and Targeted Transparency
A. Peterson's Proposed Warning Sign
In light of the inadequacy of land use ordinances, Professor
Peterson has proposed that local governments create ordinances
requiring payday lenders bear a "cautionary message on signs at
[their] businesses" when they "[offer] credit at annual percentage
rates exceeding 45%."219 An example of suggested language for the
ordinance is included in his Appendix A.220 He suggested the
following language for his cautionary message: "City of Anywhere
Warning: Predatory Lender." 221 The message would be required on
all of the payday lender's exterior signs, covering one-third of the
space, and in black text on a white background. 222 The placement
on all exterior signs is an attempt to discourage payday lenders
from advertising their locations as well as to put potential
borrowers on alert.2 23
Furthermore, Professor Peterson proposes the cautionary message
also be placed on the payday lender's door with an "additional
explanation indicating: that the city or county in question has
determined that the facility displaying the sign engages in predatory
lending; that the local government requires predatory lending
warnings on displayed signs under a consumer protection law; that the
lender offers loans at interest rates above 45%; and, that "[tihese loans
can cause bounced checks, penalty fees, repossession lawsuits, and
severe financial hardship."224 Permit fees would cover the cost of
enforcing the proposed ordinance.2 5 Both the local government and
217. Lohrentz, supra note 43, 17-18.
218. Peterson, supra note 26, at 939.
219. Id. at 941.
220. Id. at 969-70.
221. Id. at 941.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 941-42.
225. Id. at 942.
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borrowers could bring enforcement actions against violators.
226
Peterson argues that his proposal does not trigger issues of
preemption because local governments are granted "all powers not
expressly denied by state statute" and most of the states that require
enumerated powers "have expressly granted local governments the
broad authority to enact any laws or regulations that are 'reasonably
related' to the promotion of 'health, safety, morals, peace, or general
welfare."' 227 Additionally, a local government's authority to regulate
the general welfare of its citizens has been consistently held to include
the authority to regulate consumer finances, such as payday
lending.228 He bolsters his claim that states have not fully occupied
the field of payday lender regulation by pointing to the existence of
the numerous zoning ordinances that blatantly target the industry.
229
Specifically, the cautionary message is unlikely to contradict any
express provisions codified in state consumer protection statutes.
230
Nor should it violate the United States Constitution.
231
If Peterson's preemption analysis is correct, local governments
in California should be able to pass cautionary message ordinances
without preemption concerns. 232 The California Financial Code does
not specify limits on the abilities of its local governments to regulate
payday lenders' storefronts. 233  The disclosure requirements
articulated in section 23035, including those incorporated from the
federal Truth in Lending Act, do not mention storefront signs or
provide limitations on the information that can be disseminated in
disclosures. 234 Rather, it establishes a minimum standard for payday
lenders to meet.
B. Targeted Transparency
Although Professor Peterson's proposed warning sign is a good
start, especially because the placement on exterior signage and doors
means consumers are presented with the risk information at the time
226. Peterson, supra note 26, at 942.
227. Id. at 947-48.
228. Id. at 948.
229. Id. at 951.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 952-68 (analyzing how the cautionary message is acceptable under the First
Amendment either under the Government Speech Doctrine or Compelled Commercial
Speech).
232. See supra Part IV.A.
233. Cal. Fin. Code §§ 23000-23106 (2004).
234. Id. at § 23035 (2004).
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and place they would make a borrowing decision,235 it may not be
enough to effectuate a significant change in consumer practices and
would doubtfully stop the most financially vulnerable from falling
victim to this poverty-perpetuating product. The authors of the
legislative transparency book Full Disclosure explain that providing
"[jiust the facts" (i.e., this location is a predatory lender that charges
above 45% APR, which can lead to consequences, such as bounced
checks and severe financial hardship) might be inadequate, because
such an approach "fail[s] to recognize that potential users may not
respond in ways that models of rational behavior predict."
236
In a rational world, a cautionary message similar to the one
Professor Peterson suggests should put borrowers on notice to
inquire about the realistic consequences of taking out a payday loan,
especially those with limited income. However, the apprehension
that the warning is meant to evoke is not likely to manifest as
"[p]eople do not seek or use information about risks even when
making risk-related purchases" 237 like payday loans. Even those that
might heed the sign and attempt to evaluate the risk will likely assess
their individual risk incorrectly because "[pleople tend to
substantially overestimate risks associated with unlikely events...
(such as chemical accidents or airplane crashes)" and "underestimate
the risks posed by events in which they perceive themselves as having
greater control (such as smoking, eating high-fat foods, or speeding
on the highway)." 238 The act of borrowing a payday loan likely falls
into the latter category, as borrowers exert some sense of agency in
initiating the agreement by entering a storefront or filling out an
application online. Furthermore, the times when people are more
likely to attempt to reduce their risk is when the consequences are
described in "graphic (rather than clinical) terms."239  When
contrasted to anti-smoking campaigns that emphasize personal stories
and images of those negatively affected by smoking, it is clear that
Professor Peterson's cautionary sign is "clinical" rather than
"graphic." The phrase "predatory lender" is a complicated term of art
and the list of consequences Professor Peterson proposes -bounced
checks and severe financial hardship 240 -come across as theoretical.
So theoretical that they can be dismissed as easily as the carcinogen
warning signs that seem to be present in every commercial location in
235. FUNG ET AL., supra note 60, at 57.
236. Id. at 34.
237. Id. at 33.
238. Id. at 33.
239. Id.
240. Peterson, supra note 26, at 942.
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California, which state that entering the premises exposes a person
to carcinogens, but fails to give the probabilities of contracting an
illness or other negative effects.
For a transparency measure to be effective and reach the
consumer it needs to be "embedded," meaning: (1) the consumer
must perceive it as valuable in achieving his or her goals, (2) it must
be compatible with his or her decision-making process, and (3) it
must be comprehensible. 241 Municipal measures like the County of
Los Angeles' restaurant hygiene grading system are held in high
regard as an example of effective transparency, because the grades
"have become highly embedded in customers'... existing decision
making process."242 Each restaurant receives a letter grade with a
corresponding vivid color, or a grey number if the score falls below
70.243 The grades are successful because they are available where
and when needed-on the storefront and viewable before entering
the restaurant -convey useful information in a comprehensible
format about the cleanliness, and therefore the potential health risks
of eating there. 244 After implementing the mandatory grading
system, the county experienced a 5.3% increase in hygiene quality
and a 13.1% decrease in hospitalizations due to food-borne diseases,
a decrease that persisted in subsequent years.245 The continued
existence of restaurant grading systems, which vary in local
jurisdictions, 246 demonstrate that these measures are under the local
government jurisdiction and do not pose any issues of preemption,
at least none that have been challenged thus far.
C. Grading Payday Lenders Through TargetedTransparency
Considering its level of success in conveying information and
improving the health of its citizenry, California local governments who
want to effectively inform their citizens about the dangers of payday
lending and discourage the use of these loans should adopt measures
that emulate Los Angeles County's restaurant hygiene grading system.
A highly visual grade or star rating system coupled with an easy-to-
understand breakdown of the real financial consequences could help
241. FUNG ET AL., supra note 60, at 55.
242. Id. at 82.
243. Grading and Posting Requirements for Retail Food Facilities, L.A. CNTY. PUB. HEALTH,
http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/eh/misc/ehpost.htm (last visited Oct. 27,2014).
244. FUNG ET AL, supra note 60, at 83.
245. Id. at 93.
246. Restaurant Grading System, ALAMEDA CNTY. DEP'T OF ENVTL. HEALTH,
http://www.acgov.org/aceh/food/grading.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
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potential borrowers accurately assess the risk and make an informed
decision. The grade should be based on a variety of factors, including:
the APR; the average length of time it takes to repay the loan; the
average interest and fees incurred by borrowers; the percentage of
customers that borrow repeatedly; how often the payday lender
contacts the borrower, family, and friends to collect; and additional
important factors. The accompanying easy-to-understand financial
breakdown should clearly state the dollar amount of the average loan
(or perhaps also the highest amount allowed under state law), the
average time it takes to repay that loan, the corresponding APR, the
corresponding amount of fees and costs associated with it, and the
average total cost of the product. This should be stated in dollar amounts
as there is evidence that "although people do not understand APR
disclosures, they do understand... [disclosures given in] a dollar
amount." 247 Similar to the restaurant hygiene grades, the payday
lending grade and accompanying easy-to-understand financial
breakdown should be placed on the storefront where potential
borrowers can review it before entering the location. As Peterson
suggested for his cautionary message, permit fees could fund the
implementation of a grading and financial disclosure measure, which
might require inspectors similar to health inspectors to ensure accuracy.
Additionally, if it is explained as arising out of the need to care for its
citizens' general welfare, the measure should remain in the local
government's jurisdiction without courting any issues of preemption.
Such a measure would easily meet the compatibility and
comprehension factors discussed in "Full Disclosure." 248 The grade
and supplemental information would be available at the time and
place potential borrowers are considering whether to borrow the
payday loan, making it relatable to the decision. The information
would be immediately digestible, as normative signs and visual
graphics, such as letter grades, are considered an effective way to
distill and communicate complex data.249  The supplemental
information gives more interested potential borrowers quick access
to more detailed information, but does not overburden them.
The crux is that potential borrowers may not consider the grading
and financial breakdown valuable if they "believe they have few
meaningful choices to make."250 There are few alternatives available to
those that take out payday loans and potential borrowers may perceive
247. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 904
(2007).
248. FUNG ET AL., supra note 60, at 55.
249. Id. at 57, 59, 61.
250. Id. at 56.
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even fewer alternatives if they fear a bank or alternative source will
refuse to lend to them due to bad credit. This can only be alleviated by
educating the community on available alternatives. When California's
SB 896, which is aimed at improving financial health and literacy, takes
effect, or if the aforementioned USPS's proposal comes to fruition, then
reasonable alternatives may come to the forefront and increase the
value of the proposed measure. Once borrowers use payday "grades"
in determining whether to take out a payday loan, payday lenders are
more likely to incorporate that consumer response into their business
model.251 This could lead to self-regulation in a manner similar to the
restaurant industry in Los Angeles, 252 and result in a lowered APR and
a cleaning-up of other egregious practices in an effort to obtain a better
grade. Conclusion
The payday lending industry is detrimental to the citizens of
California and all the states that permit its presence. These
businesses use deceptive advertising and financial information to
target vulnerable potential borrowers, especially those in
neighborhoods with a high proportion of low-income minorities.
This entices people into long cycles of debt, which exacerbates
poverty by dramatically depleting resources that would otherwise
go toward basic needs. Local governments in California can
discourage the practice and lessen its negative impact by
implementing measures that emulate the Los Angeles County
restaurant hygiene grading system to accurately and effectively
inform potential borrowers about the actual consequences of taking
out a payday loan. Local governments can support their measures
by providing an assessment on the vulnerability of its citizens.
These assessments could be accomplished by consulting the California
Department of Corporations and the advocacy group the Center for
Responsible Lending, or other similarly situated organizations.
However, due to limited alternatives and the lived experience of
negotiating conditions of poverty, even if grading measures are
successfully implemented and enforced it is likely that many California
residents will still feel pressured into take out payday loans and incur
severe financial hardship. In order to protect those that will either
251. FUNG ET AL., supra note 60, at 65 (stating that "[clhanges in information users'
behavior usually are not enough to make transparency policy effective. Information
disclosers must also alter their decisions and actions. When disclosers incorporate user
responses to information into their decision calculus, we say that new information has
become embedded in discloser decision-making process.").
252. Id. at 50.
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ignore the measures or believe they have no feasible alternative,
California should pass substantial statewide reform that caps payday
loan APR at a reasonable rate253 and include the other regulatory
measures stated in the unsuccessful SB 515 proposed in February
2013.254 A statewide measure would also mean California could better
protect its citizens from online payday lenders by giving the state
grounds to bring actions against those that sell payday products
exceeding the new maximum APR.
Even if reform is successfully passed, it is clear there is a need for
reasonable alternative small-dollar loan programs. The current
pilotprograms in California do not appear effective, but this could
change once substantive reform is passed. USPS's recent proposal to
provide small-dollar loans at a reasonable APR may provide a model
solution. As a non-profit organization USPS does not need to charge
the high APR that keeps payday loan borrowers in a long-term cycle of
debt. This program would simultaneously help increase borrowers'
financial stability and decrease poverty overall by permitting low-
income communities to direct their limited resources to meeting their
basic needs. California's recent passage of SB 896-perhaps inspired by
USPS's proposal-which will allow local non-profits to provide a zero-
APR alternative to payday loans, is the most promising statewide
change.255  However, it remains to be seen how successful this
alternative will be against well-established and entrenched payday
lending institutions. For California to truly protect its low-income
communities of color, it is imperative that it pass comprehensive
statewide payday lending regulation.
253. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7.
254. Sen. Jackson, supra note 15.
255. S. 896, 2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014) (enacted) (amending California's Financial Code to
add sections 22066 and 22067).
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